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Logic Journal of IGPL Advance Access originally published online on October 26, 2007
Logic Journal of IGPL 2007 15(5-6):603-619; doi:10.1093/jigpal/jzm041
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© The Author, 2007. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Language and Logical Pluralism: Some Aspects of a Wittgensteinian Perspective on the Nature of Logic

Susana Gómez

Departamento de Filosofía Universidad Nacional de Colombia, AK 30 # 45-03 Bogotá (Colombia)

E-mail: sgomezg{at}unal.edu.co, batata.susana{at}gmail.com


  Abstract

This essay examines the importance of some aspects of Wittgenstein's post-Tractatus work in the realm of discussions on the nature of logic. The first part considers a relationship between certain conceptions of language and certain positions on the nature of logical laws and logical pluralism. Supposing the rejection of mentalism in the field of meaning leads to a rejection of psychologism, it presents some alternatives different from psychologism, based on non mentalistic theories of meaning. One is the Platonistic Fregean approach to language and logic, the other is Carnap's formalist view on both topics. The second part concentrates on Wittgenstein's non mentalistic and non Platonistic proposals about language and his defense of the logical pluralism proposed by psychologists. It compares two periods on Wittgenstein's work after Tractatus -the periods of ‘calculus conception’ and ‘languange games conception’- and it shows how characteristic notions of Wittgenstein's later conception of language, like ‘use’, ‘language games’, and ‘forms of life’, work on the characterization of logic and specially on the kind of logical pluralism that the author seems to defend in his last period. In doing so, this essay offers an approach to some of the author's considerations about contradictions and the possibility of the existence of a calculus that includes them. This approach emphasizes on the idea of applicability (or use of a linguistic expression) introduced by the author in some of his last works, and in some examples of functional contradictions that can help to understand and complement that idea.

Key Words: Psychologism • mentalism • logical pluralism • use • language games • forms of life.

Received for publication 14 September 2006.
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