© 1995 by Oxford University Press
Original Articles |
Belief Revision From the Point of View of Doxastic Logic
Filosofiska Institutionen, Uppsala Universitet Villavägen 5, S-752 36 Uppsala, Sweden E-mail: Krister.Segerberg{at}filosofi.uu.se
In 1985 Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson presented their now classic theory (ACM) of theory change (belief revision). In 1988 Adam Grove, generalizing David Lewis's theory of counterfactuals, presented a model theory suitable for the AGM theory. Although AGM and Grove mentioned object languages, neither used them. But recently, Maarten de Rijke has shown how object languages can be brought into the picture. In the present paper we take de Rijke's idea further, addressing the question whether there is a particular doxastic or epistemic logic implicit in AGM.
Key Words: doxastic logic belief revision