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Logic Journal of IGPL Advance Access published online on September 9, 2009
Logic Journal of IGPL, doi:10.1093/jigpal/jzp038
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© The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

The role of goals in belief selection

Guido Boella

Università degli Studi di Torino, Dipartimento di Informatica, 10149, Torino, Cso Svizzera 185, Italy.
E-mail: guido{at}di.unito.it

Célia da Costa Pereira

Université degli Studi di Milano, Dipartimento di Tecnologie dell’Informazione, 26013, Crema, via Bramante 65, Italy.
E-mail: celia.pereira{at}unimi.it

Gabriella Pigozzi

Université du Luxembourg, Computer Science and Communication, L-1359, Luxembourg, rue Richard Coudenhove -Kalergi 6, Luxembourg.
E-mail: gabriella.pigozzi{at}uni.lu

Andrea Tettamanzi

Università degli Studi di Milano, Dipartimento di Tecnologie dell’Informazione, 26013, Crema, via Bramante 65, Italy.
E-mail: andrea.tettamanzi{at}unimi.it

Leendert van der Torre

Université du Luxembourg, Computer Science and Communication, L-1359, Luxembourg, rue Richard Coudenhove–Kalergi 6, Luxembourg.
E-mail: leendert{at}vandertorre.com


  Abstract

In this paper we consider the relation between beliefs and goals in agent theory. Beliefs play three roles in reasoning about goals: they play a role in the generation of unconditional desires from conditional ones, they play a role in adoption of desires as goals, and they play a role in the selection of plans to achieve goals. In this paper we consider the role of goals in reasoning about beliefs. Though we assume that goals do not play a role in the belief generation problem, we argue that they play a role in the belief selection problem. We show the rationality of the use of goals in belief selection, in the sense that there are cases in which agents that take their goals into account in selecting a belief set from a set of alternatives outperform agents that do not do so. We also formally distinguish between the rational role of goals in belief selection and irrational wishful thinking.

Key Words: Rational agents • indeterministic belief revision • qualitative decision theory

Received for publication 15 January 2008.
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