Logic Journal of IGPL

Logic Journal of IGPL Advance Access originally published online on February 26, 2009
Logic Journal of IGPL 2009 17(2):179-203; doi:10.1093/jigpal/jzp003

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© The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Economic theory and the Alternative Set Theory AFA^–+AD+DC

Fernando Tohmé

Departamento de Economía - UNS, CONICET, Argentina.
E-mail: ftohme{at}criba.edu.ar

Many authors in the discipline as well as outsiders have claimed that the main results from Mathematical Economics are far removed from real world phenomena. A more precise version of this position is that one of the main reasons for this unrealistic stance is the use of the wrong formal tools. So, for example, it has been pointed out that the computability of choice functions as well as the existence of economic equilibria and of states of the world may not be ensured in general if the assumed set theory is ZFC. We will show that there exists a very natural set theory that overcomes some formal limitations of contemporary economic theory. A switch to an alternative set theory helps to obtain in a more natural way results widely accepted by mathematical economists. Moreover, alternative set-theoretical frameworks convey different intuitions about how agents behave when solving problems. We claim that AFA^–+AD+DC is the adequate alternative set-theoretical universe for economic theory.

Key Words: Economic Theory • Axiom of Determinacy • Choice Axioms • Anti-Foundation Axioms • Computability

Received for publication 17 January 2007.

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