Logic Journal of IGPL Advance Access originally published online on April 29, 2009
Logic Journal of IGPL 2009 17(3):227-265; doi:10.1093/jigpal/jzp006
A defeasible logic for modelling policy-based intentions and motivational attitudes
NICTA, Queensland Research Laboratory, Australia.
E-mail: guido.governatori{at}nicta.com.au
Information Sciences, University of Hyderabad, India.
E-mail: vineetcs{at}uohyd.ernet.in
CIRSIFD and Law Faculty, University of Bologna, Italy.
E-mail: antonino.rotolo{at}unibo.it
IIIS, Griffith University, Queensland, Australia.
E-mail: a.sattar{at}griffith.edu.au
In this paper we show how defeasible logic could formally account for the non-monotonic properties involved in motivational attitudes like intention and obligation. Usually, normal modal operators are used to represent such attitudes wherein classical logical consequence and the rule of necessitation comes into play, i.e., 
A/ 
A, that is from A derive A. This means that such formalisms are affected by the Logical Omniscience problem. We show that policy-based intentions exhibit non-monotonic behaviour which could be captured through a non-monotonic system like defeasible logic. To this end we outline a defeasible logic of intention that specifies how modalities can be introduced and manipulated in a non-monotonic setting without giving rise to the problem of logical omniscience. In a similar way we show how to add deontic modalities defeasibly and how to integrate them with other motivational attitudes like beliefs and goals. Finally we show that the basic aspect of the BOID architecture is captured by this extended framework.
Received for publication 14 June 2006.
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