Logic Journal of IGPL Advance Access originally published online on August 19, 2006
Logic Journal of IGPL 2006 14(5):745-754; doi:10.1093/jigpal/jzl008
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After Gödel
Department of Philosophy, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.
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This paper describes the enormous impact of Gödel's work on mathematical logic and recursion theory. After a brief description of the major theorems that Gödel proved, it focuses on subsequent work extending what he did, sometimes by quite different methods. The paper closes with a new result, applying Gödel's methods to show that if scientific epistemology (what Chomsky calls our "scientific competence") could be completely represented by a particular Turing machine, then it would be impossible for us to know that fact.
Key Words: Gödel Tarski Kripke Chomsky completeness incompleteness continuum hypothesis axiom of choice model theory prime numbers Diophantine equations competence epistemology