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Logic Journal of IGPL Advance Access first published online on September 25, 2007
This version published online on September 25, 2007
Logic Journal of IGPL, doi:10.1093/jigpal/jzm047
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© The Author, 2007. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Criteria of Identity and their Logical Form

Makmiller Martins Pedroso

Department of Philosophy, University of Calgary, Canada. E-mail: makmiller.pedroso{at}ucalgary.ca


  Abstract

The goal of this paper is to wonder whether there is some pattern preserved throughout every criterion of identity. Two solutions will be examined: Leibniz's Law and Lowe's criterion of identity. In particular, it will be defended the following theses about them:

  1. they are circular definitions;
  2. their circularity, by itself, does not make them untenable accounts.

Key Words: criteria of identity • logical form • circular definitions


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